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LETTER DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letter to you of 24 November 1992 (S/24859), in which I conveyed to the Security Council a report on the deteriorating situation in Somalia, with particular reference to the factors that were preventing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) from implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

I referred especially to the present lack of a government in Somalia, to the failure of various factions to cooperate with UNOSOM, to the extortion, blackmail and robbery to which the international relief effort is subjected and to repeated attacks on the personnel and equipment of the United Nations and other relief agencies.

In the last paragraph of my letter I stated that I was giving urgent consideration to this problem and that I did not exclude the possibility that it might become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia.

The members of the Security Council discussed my letter during informal consultations on 25 November 1992. They expressed the view that the situation that I had described was intolerable. They doubted whether the methods employed by the United Nations to date would be capable of bringing that situation under control. Strong support was expressed for my view that the time had come when it was necessary to move into Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The members of the Council therefore welcomed my reference to a re-examination of basic premises and principles and they asked me to come forward with specific recommendations on how the United Nations could remedy the present situation.

In the present letter I have set out five options for the Security Council's consideration. They are all addressed to the immediate humanitarian issue, namely the question of how to create conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies to the starving people of Somalia. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that this is only part, albeit the most urgent part, of the problem in Somalia and that efforts are also required to

create the political conditions in which Somalia can begin to resolve its political problems and rehabilitate its economy. This is an integral part of UNOSOM's mandate and it is important that further measures to protect humanitarian relief supplies should be accompanied by continuing efforts to promote national reconciliation. In my letter of 24 November I expressed the hope that the technical meeting that is to be held in Addis Ababa from 3 to 5 December 1992 would not only discuss humanitarian matters but also try to initiate the process of rebuilding a civil society.

The first option would be to continue and intensify my efforts of recent months to deploy UNOSOM in the strength of approximately 4,200 troops authorized by resolution 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992 and the letter of 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to me (S/24532). Under this option UNOSOM would continue to be guided by the existing principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations. This means that it would not deploy without the agreement of the de facto authorities at each location where it was to operate and that it would not use force except in self-defence, though self-defence would, as at present, be deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempted by force to prevent it from carrying out its mandate.

However, the conclusion that emerged clearly from my letter of 24 November 1992 and from the Security Council's discussion of it the following day is that the situation in Somalia has deteriorated beyond the point at which it is susceptible to the peace-keeping treatment. Several of the de facto authorities, including especially General Aidid, have refused to agree to the deployment of United Nations troops in areas where the need for humanitarian relief is most acute. Even when they have agreed, their subsequent cooperation with UNOSOM has been at best spasmodic and, by their own admission, they do not exercise effective authority over all the armed elements in the areas which they claim to control. In Mogadishu, for instance, neither Mr. Ali Mahdi nor General Aidid will admit responsibility for the forces that have shelled and rocketed the Pakistani battalion and shelled a World Food Programme ship in recent days. The reality is that there are at present very few authorities in Somalia with whom a peace-keeping force can safely negotiate an agreed basis for its operations.

I am accordingly confirmed in the view that to continue to pursue UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.

A second option would be to abandon the idea of using international military personnel to protect humanitarian activities, withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM and leave the humanitarian agencies to negotiate the best arrangements they can with the various faction and clan leaders. When I first proposed, in my report of 21 April 1992 (S/23829), that the United Nations deploy "security personnel" to Somalia, some humanitarian agencies expressed the view that the injection of United Nations military personnel into an already complex situation would increase the dangers they faced. Other agencies, however, have pressed for a greater and more effective United Nations military presence.

The experience of recent months has been that, without international military protection, the agencies have felt obliged to pay what is in effect protection money to the various factions, clans and sub-clans. If the international community were to allow this to continue, it would be committing itself to an endless process in which less and less of the aid it provided would reach vulnerable groups and in which lawless trading in that aid would become, even more than at present, the foundation of Somalia's economy. Such an outcome would encourage further fragmentation and destroy hopes of national reconciliation.

While acknowledging that the expectations that I had of UNOSOM have not been fulfilled, I am more than ever convinced of the need for international military personnel to be deployed in Somalia. The current difficulties are due not to their presence but to the fact that not enough of them are there and that they do not have the right mandate. I therefore exclude the option of withdrawal.

The above considerations have led me to the conclusion that the Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to adopt more forceful measures to secure the humanitarian operations in Somalia. In the remainder of this letter, therefore, I have set out, for the Security Council's appraisal and eventual decision, three alternative options, all of which involve the possible use of force by the United Nations or by Member States so authorized by the Security Council.

At present no government exists in Somalia that could request and allow such use of force. It would therefore be necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security. The Council would also have to determine that non-military measures as referred to in Chapter VII were not capable of giving effect to the Council's decisions.

The purpose of each of the three options involving the possible use of force would be to ensure, on a lasting basis, that the current violence against the international relief effort was brought to an end. To achieve this, it would be necessary for at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions to be neutralized and brought under international control and for the irregular forces and gangs to be disarmed. It is to be noted that this action would help de facto to bring about a cease-fire between the warring factions and that this would be a positive factor in the context of national reconciliation.

I should at this point like to make another observation which is common to all three of these options. It relates to the security of the 400 or so international civilian personnel (in UNOSOM and international agencies and non-governmental organizations engaged in relief work) and the 550 military personnel of UNOSOM who are already in Somalia. Their security is already threatened as a result of recent public speculation about military

intervention. It is imperative that plans for a more forceful approach should include adequate arrangements to ensure their security.

The third option would be for UNOSOM to undertake a show of force in the city of Mogadishu, in order to create conditions there for the safe delivery of humanitarian relief and to deter factions and other armed groups there and elsewhere in Somalia from withholding cooperation from UNOSOM. It would be based on the belief held by some, but by no means all, experts on Somalia that a determined show, and if necessary use, of force by UNOSOM would be enough to convince those who are currently abusing and exploiting the international relief effort that they should cease their lawless activities.

After my Military Adviser visited Somalia recently I asked him to define various scenarios for more forceful action by UNOSOM. In the context of a possible show of force in Mogadishu he advised me that the arms at the disposal of the various factions and armed groups are not negligible:

> "The troops in the city number several thousand when counting all the clans, sub-clans and free-roaming bandits. In Mogadishu South alone, there are approximately 150 'technical' vehicles. Each vehicle carries a heavy machine gun or 106 mm RR anti-tank gun. In each of these vehicles there are 8 to 12 soldiers armed mainly with AK 47s, G3 rifles and anti-armour RPG-7. The local forces have no uniforms and no communication. Vehicles are of different types, colours, patterns and shapes. The state of training of these troops is unknown but almost all would have had some kind of combat experience and they know how to operate all their weapons. The condition of their weapons is surprisingly good; ammunition is old but plentiful and still operational. In addition, they have several operational armoured wheeled vehicles with cannons of 20 mm and dump trucks with twin 30 mm AA guns. It must be assumed that the equivalent military force exists in Mogadishu North. Both sides have indirect fire capabilities (mortars, field guns and free flight rockets)."

If the Security Council decided in favour of this third option, it would wish to satisfy itself that a show of force in Mogadishu would succeed in creating conditions throughout Somalia for the secure delivery of relief supplies. Starvation can be ended only if the relief agencies can use all the ports and airports in the country and if they have unimpeded access to all places where need exists. There may be reasons to doubt whether a successful operation in Mogadishu would be sufficient to persuade the factions and armed groups elsewhere to mend their ways and give up the substantial material benefits which they gain from their current abuse of the international relief effort. I am therefore inclined to think that if action is to be effective, a country-wide operation may be required. This would be a major military undertaking and would give rise to many difficult questions, especially as regards organization, command and control.

One possibility - and this is the fourth option - would be a country-wide enforcement operation undertaken by a group of Member States authorized to do so by the Security Council.

In this connection, I wish to inform the members of the Council that on 25 November 1992 I received a visit from Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America, who informed me that if the Security Council were to decide to authorize Member States to use forceful means to ensure the delivery of relief supplies to the people of Somalia, the United States would be ready to take the lead in organizing and commanding such an operation, in which a number of other Member States would also participate.

If the members of the Security Council were to favour this option, my advice would be that the Council should seek to agree with the Member States who would undertake the operation on ways of recognizing the fact that it had been authorized by the Security Council and that the Security Council therefore had a legitimate interest in the manner in which it was carried out.

Various possibilities could be considered. The enabling resolution could underline that the military operation was being authorized in support of the wider mandate entrusted to the Secretary-General to provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Somalia. The initial authorization could be for a specific period of time and the Member States concerned could be asked to furnish the Security Council with regular reports, on the basis of which the Council would, at specified intervals, review the authority it had given for the operation to take place. It could also be stated in the enabling resolution that the purpose of the operation was to resolve the immediate security problem and that it would be replaced by a United Nations peace-keeping operation, organized on conventional lines, as soon as the irregular groups had been disarmed and the heavy weapons of the organized factions brought under international control. The resolution could also stipulate that the operation would be conducted with full respect for the applicable rules of humanitarian law. The Security Council, or the Secretary-General on its behalf, could attach a small liaison staff to the field headquarters of the operation. The Council could appoint an ad hoc Commission of some of its members, which would visit the operation in the field from time to time. If the members of the Security Council decide in favour of this fourth option, they may wish to give thought to these ideas.

A fifth option, which would be consistent with the recent expansion of the Organization's role in the maintenance of international peace and security and which would strengthen its long-term evolution as an effective system of collective security, would be for a country-wide enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command and control. This could be exercised by the Secretary-General, mandated by the Security Council in an arrangement similar to that followed in the Organization's peace-keeping operations, or by some other arrangement which the Security Council might decide upon. The Secretariat, already overstretched in managing greatly enlarged peace-keeping commitments, does not at present have the capability to command and control an enforcement operation of the size and urgency required by the present crisis in Somalia. It would therefore be necessary for the Member States contributing troops for such an operation to provide personnel not only for the headquarters in the field but also in New York, where considerable

additional staff would be required. Those Member States would also have to be ready to accept that the United Nations would command and control the operation and that the staff officers whom they would provide in the field and in New York would take their orders from the United Nations and not from their national authorities.

These are points which some Member States might find difficult to accept when many lives and much valuable equipment could be at stake. Those who found it impossible to accept them could still support the operation by providing logistic support under national command and control. But the Security Council would have to satisfy itself that enough troops would be available on this basis for an operation on the scale required in Somalia.

To sum up, I recommend that the Security Council take a very early decision to adjust its approach to the crisis in Somalia. That crisis results from the fact that Somalia has become a country without a government or other political authorities with whom the basis for humanitarian activities can be negotiated. The focus of the Council's immediate action should be to create conditions in which relief supplies can be delivered to those in need. Experience has shown that this cannot be achieved by a United Nations operation based on the accepted principles of peace-keeping. There is now no alternative but to resort to Chapter VII of the Charter. In parallel, there must also be action to promote national reconciliation and thus remove the main factors that have created the humanitarian emergency. If forceful action is taken, it should preferably be under United Nations command and control. If this is not feasible, an alternative would be an operation undertaken by Member States acting with the authorization of the Security Council. In either case the objectives of the operation should be precisely defined and limited in time, in order to prepare the way for a return to peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building.

I should be grateful, Mr. President, if you would bring the contents of this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council. For my part, I intend, in accordance with resolution 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992 and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council, to convey to the heads of the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference my assessment of the present situation in Somalia.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Agenda item 143
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 27 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Joint Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan and Regional Countries, held at Istanbul on 25 November 1992, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Mr. Hikmet Cetin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey (see annex).

The following countries were represented at the Conference: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey. Italy attended the Conference as an observer. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unable to participate in the Conference, owing to physical difficulties in reaching Istanbul from Sarajevo.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 143, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Joint Declaration adopted by the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan and Regional Countries, held at Istanbul on 25 November 1992

The Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan and Regional Countries,

Profoundly concerned about the internecine fighting in the former Yugoslavia which has been causing tragic loss of human life and material damage, and about consequences for the countries of the region, in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and of potential spillover effects of the use of force in Kosovo, Vojvodina, Sandzak and the Republic of Macedonia, with the risk of drawing the countries of the region into conflict,

Particularly worried about the extremely tense situation in Kosovo and conscious of the fact that further escalation of the tension is dangerous for peace and stability in the region,

Determined to assume their inherent responsibility in the region, based on the historical ties which link the countries of the region with each other for reasons of common geography, history and culture,

Recalling and reaffirming their commitment to all the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions,

Reaffirming their full support for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and in particular for the proposal by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference on the constitutional structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the context of their commitment to the principles of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, a/

Noting with grave concern the human drama and tragic events which having started in the northern part of the former Yugoslavia are now spreading to the south,

Noting in particular the report of the Special Rapporteur, appointed following the special session of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights situation in the former Yugoslavia, which makes clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights and grave breaches of international humanitarian law continue in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Muslims overwhelmingly being the victims,

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a/ A/45/859, annex.

Fully conscious that delay, hesitation and errors in conveying the resolve of the international community against the ongoing violation of internationally acclaimed principles in the former Yugoslavia set an unfavourable and dangerous precedent for peace and stability in the Balkans and beyond,

1. Resolutely declares that any acquisition of territory by force and any practice of "ethnic cleansing" is unlawful and unacceptable, will not be permitted and will have to be reversed, and that all refugees must be enabled to return in peace to their former homes;

2. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to respect strictly the territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty and national identity of all the States of the former Yugoslavia;

3. Condemns refusals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, to comply with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, demanding that they fulfil immediately their obligations;

4. Firmly believes that Sarajevo, as the symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina's statehood, must be saved at all costs and the shock waves that its fall would send throughout the former Yugoslavia, to the Balkans, indeed to the whole of Europe, must be prevented, and requests the Foreign Ministers of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to consider meeting in Sarajevo as soon as possible;

5. Opposes grave discrimination on ethnical or religious grounds, especially in the regions noted for their rich heritage of cultural, religious, ethnical and national multiplicity;

6. Demands all necessary steps to be taken jointly for the restoration and repair of the historical, religious and cultural heritage in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which embodies the common values of the peoples of the world;

7. Calls upon the relevant international organizations to urgently establish militarily protected safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

8. Also calls upon the relevant international organizations to establish, effectively operate and protect a maximum possible number of corridors for the transport of humanitarian relief goods;

9. Urges the rapid deployment of United Nations observers on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with operative paragraph 16 of United Nations Security Council resolution 787 (1992) and further urges the United Nations Security Council to examine the possibility of deploying forces in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak, as well as in the Republic of Macedonia, to contain the extremely explosive situation reigning in these areas, taking into consideration the relevant decisions of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

10. Strongly urges all parties concerned to exercise the greatest moderation and restraint over Kosovo, and particularly federal authorities (Serbia-Montenegro) to use their influence to ensure continued involvement of Serbian authorities in the Geneva Conference-brokered talks on the situation in Kosovo; the Serbian authorities, as well as the Kosovan leadership to cooperate with the Conference; and all the sides to contain extremist elements under their control;

11. Warns that the spread of the conflict to other areas would lead to unforeseeable consequences and would have to be stopped by most resolute actions of the international community;

12. Calls upon the international community to review the necessity of the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and the positive effects on peace and cooperation in the Balkans, including the membership of this republic in the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;

13. Supports the convening of a special session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to discuss the report of its Special Rapporteur, Mr. Mazowiecki, and the initiative to determine those personally accountable for crimes against humanity;

14. Calls upon the international community to contribute to the promotion of independent and objective information in the former Yugoslavia and requests all parties concerned to cooperate with the United Nations, in particular with the United Nations Protection Force, in the intensification of their information activities;

15. Urges the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to convene in December a ministerial meeting of the Conference in order to undertake the necessary steps to implement its statement of principles and enhance the effectiveness of the Conference, referring in this context to the recently made French proposal;

16. Calls for an early reactivation of Balkan cooperation revived in 1988 in Belgrade which has been interrupted upon the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia;

17. Decides to hold consultations, at the level of senior officials, open to all Balkan and neighbouring States to meet periodically, or when necessary, to review the developments related to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, to coordinate approaches, to prepare recommendations to their respective Governments and to consider the best ways and means to assist the Geneva Conference, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations aimed at a peaceful and speedy resolution of the conflict;

18. Decides to communicate copies of the present Declaration to the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the European Community.

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LETTER DATED 27 NOVEMBER 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter dated 20 November 1992 (S/24840) and in accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, I should like to share with the Council further information received by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) regarding apparent violations of the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Between 20 and 26 November 1992, there appear to have been 55 flights of fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina other than those exempted in accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 781 (1992) or approved by UNPROFOR in accordance with paragraph 3 of that resolution. In addition, information has become available about another 17 flights between 17 and 19 November that were not listed in my letter dated 20 November. Details as to the time and itinerary of these flights are attached in annexes I and II to the present letter.

All confirmed violations were immediately protested by UNPROFOR to the party concerned.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex I

Flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations Protection Force (20-26 November 1992)

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
150	20 November	0904	0942	A Galeb aircraft, tail number 24261, took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani airfield. This aircraft was checked and found to be carrying no ordnance. An aircraft detected 5 NM west of Sanski Most at 0912 by AWACS was possibly this aircraft. The track faded at Sanski Most at 0923 and landed back at Mahovljani at 0942.	North-east 150 KTS (173 mph) Low
151	20 November	0916	0954	A Super Galeb took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani airfield. This aircraft was checked and found to be carrying no ordnance. An aircraft detected by AWACS 15 NM north-west of Banja Luka at 0918 was probably this aircraft. The track faded at Metica, 35 NM south-west of Banja Luka and landed at Mahovljani at 0954.	South-west 340 KTS (390 mph) 4900 feet
152	20 November	0919	0920	An aircraft was detected 5 NM south-west of Banja Luka. The track faded after 2 NM.	North-west 70 KTS (81 mph) 900 feet
153	20 November	0942	0953	An aircraft was detected 5 NM north-west of Banja Luka. The track faded after 5 NM.	South-west 198 KTS (230 mph) Unknown
154	20 November	0943	0955	An aircraft was detected 5 NM east of Banja Luka and the track faded 5 NM north of Banja Luka.	North-west 340 KTS (390 mph) Unknown
155	20 November	0910	0952	A Galeb aircraft, tail number 24205, took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani. The aircraft was checked and found to be carrying no ordnance. This aircraft was possibly detected 5 NM south-west of Banja Luka by AWACS at 0950 and faded after 5 NM heading south. The aircraft landed back at Mahovljani at 0952.	South 245 KTS (283 mph) Unknown

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
156	20 November	1031	1107	A Galeb aircraft, tail number 24148, took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani. The aircraft was checked and found to be carrying no ordnance. This aircraft was possibly detected over Banja Luka Mahovljani by AWACS at 1034 and faded over Banja Luka at 1042. The aircraft landed back at Mahovljani at 1107.	- 270 KTS (312 mph) Low
157	20 November	1039	1113	A Super Galeb took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani. The aircraft was checked and found to be carrying no ordnance. This aircraft was possibly detected by AWACS over Banja Luka at 1112 and faded over Banja Luka soon after.	- 250 KTS (288 mph) Low
158	20 November	1400	1530	An MI-26 was observed arriving at Split by a member of UNPROFOR. Subsequent investigation into this aircraft's activities found that it had departed Vitez after delivering clothing and a container.	-
159	20 November	0726	0759	A Super Galeb took off from Banja Luka Mahovljani airfield. The aircraft was not checked for ordnance. It landed back at Mahovljani at 0759.	West-north-west 400 KTS (460 mph) 500 feet
160	20 November	1147	1207	An Utva aircraft, tail number 5025, took off from Banja Luka Zaluzani airfield and remained in the circuit performing aerobatics.	- Slow 600 feet
161	20 November	-	1320	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 12655, was seen by observers at Mahovljani at 1313 heading south. It later landed at Zaluzani airfield at 1320. This aircraft had departed Zaluzani on 19 November at 1200. After refuelling the aircraft took off again at 1358 and departed to the north.	North Slow 400 feet
162	21 November	0851	1231	A Gazelle helicopter took off from Banja Luka Zaluzani airfield. No ordnance was observed on this aircraft, which landed back at Zaluzani.	South Slow 400 feet

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
163	21 November	0857	1005	An MI-8 helicopter, tail number 12365, took off from Zaluzani airfield on a technical flight. No ordnance was observed. The aircraft performed a number of practice landings before recovering at Zaluzani at 1005.	Random Slow 500 feet
164	21 November	1001	1015	A track was detected 40 NM south-east of Mostar in the vicinity of Bileca and was tracked for 30 NM along the boundary of the "No Fly Zone" before fading at Brijeg.	North-east 120 KTS (138 mph) 3800 feet
165	21 November	1036	1512	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 13655, took off from Banja Luka Zeluzani on an unknown mission. No ordnance was observed. The length of this mission indicates the helicopter landed at an unknown destination before returning to Zaluzani.	South Slow 300 feet
166	21 November	1442	1445	An aircraft was detected 30 NM north-east of Gorazde in the vicinity of Milici and was tracked for 5 NM before fading from radar contact.	North-east 100 KTS (115 mph) Unknown
167	22 November	0735	1155	A Gazelle helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield.	South Fast 400 feet
168	22 November	1000	1121	A Gazelle helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield. The route given to the observer was Banja Luka to Petrovac, then Zaluzani.	South Slow 300 feet
169	22 November	Not known	1157	An HN-45 helicopter landed at Zaluzani airfield. It was fitted with weapon pylons.	North Slow 200 feet
170	22 November	2250	-	Sector-N reported that two unidentified aircraft flew from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Kobilja, entered the airspace of the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) heading towards Glina.	-

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SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
171	23 November	1106	1118	A Gazelle helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield.	South-east Fast 300 feet
172	23 November	1120	1535	A Gazelle helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield.	South Fast 300 feet
173	23 November	1145	1525	A Gazelle helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield.	West Fast 400 feet
174	23 November	1223	1355	A HN-45 helicopter was observed taking off and landing at Zaluzani airfield.	East Fast 3000 feet
175	23 November	1537	1539	A track was detected 20 NM west-north-west of Tuzla and tracked for 4 NM before fading from radar coverage in the region of Boljanic.	North-east 120 KTS (138 mph) Low
176	23 November	1600	1630	A CASA transport aircraft was observed landing at Cazin airfield. The airfield of departure was known to be Zagreb. The cargo contained military clothing, mail and oxygen for medical purposes.	Not reported
177	23 November	1643	1648	A track was detected 35 NM south-east of Mostar on the border of the "No Fly Zone" in the vicinity of Korita. The aircraft headed out of the "No Fly Zone" before fading from radar contact 15 NM west of Niksic.	South-east 165 KTS (190 mph) Medium
178	23 November	1730	Not known	A CASA transport aircraft was observed departing from Cazin airfield. It was carrying 14 passengers, 2 were military pilots and 4 were injured or sick children.	Not reported

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
179	23 November	1845	-	An aircraft was observed orbiting the airfield of Cazin, possibly attempting to land.	Random Slow Low
180	23 November	Not known	1917	An ANTONOV-2 transport aircraft was observed landing at Cazin airfield. It was carrying a cargo of military clothing.	Not reported
181	23 November	Not known	1928	An ANTONOV-2 transport aircraft was observed landing at Cazin airfield. It was carrying a cargo of welfare packages and mail.	Not reported
182	23 November	Not known	1947	A CASA transport aircraft was observed landing at Cazin airfield. It was carrying 6 passengers.	Not reported
183	23 November	2004	Not known	An ANTONOV-2 transport aircraft was observed departing Cazin airfield. It was carrying 9 passengers.	Not reported
184	23 November	2010	Not known	A CASA transport aircraft was observed departing Cazin airfield. It was carrying 5 passengers.	Not reported
185	23 November	2124	Not known	An ANTONOV-2 transport aircraft was observed departing Cazin airfield. It was carrying 2 passengers.	Not reported
186	24 November	0913	0918	A track was detected in the area of Banja Luka. This contact was possibly a helicopter.	Variable 200 KTS (230 mph) Low
187	25 November	1045	1210	A Gazelle helicopter was observed departing from Zaluzani airfield. The destination was not known and it later returned to land at Zaluzani.	West Slow 300 feet
188	25 November	1045	-	A Gazelle helicopter was observed departing from Zaluzani airfield.	East Slow 300 feet

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SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
189	25 November	Not known	1140	A Gazelle helicopter was observed landing at Zaluzani airfield.	North-west Slow 200 feet
190	25 November	1150	1230	An MI-8 helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. The helicopter was on a technical flight and later landed back at Zaluzani airfield.	North Slow 1000 feet
191	25 November	1236	-	A Gazelle helicopter was observed departing from Zaluzani airfield.	East Fast 500 feet
192	25 November	Not known	1625	A Gazelle helicopter was observed landing at Zaluzani airfield.	West Slow 200 feet
193	26 November	0755	0757	An HN-45 helicopter, tail number 12930, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. It did not return to the airfield.	East Slow 400 feet
194	26 November	0810	0812	An HN-45 helicopter, tail number 12929, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. It did not return to the airfield.	East Slow 500 feet
195	26 November	0815	0816	An HN-45 helicopter, tail number 12928, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. It did not return to the airfield.	South-east Slow 300 feet
196	26 November	Not known	0846	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 12893, was observed landing at Zaluzani airfield. It was painted white.	West Slow 300 feet
197	26 November	0914	1205	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 12756, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield.	South-west Slow 400 feet

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
198	26 November	1015	1022	Detected south-west of Banja Luka. This contact was possibly a helicopter.	North Slow Unknown
199	26 November	1030	1031	Detected 30 NM east of Mostar. This contact was possibly a helicopter.	North Slow Unknown
200	26 November	1105	1107	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 12893, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. It did not return.	North-east Fast 450 feet
201	26 November	1127	1157	An HN-45 helicopter, tail number 12927, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield. The helicopter was on a technical flight.	Not known Slow Low
202	26 November	1516	1519	Detected 30 NM east of Mostar.	North Slow Unknown
203	26 November	1526	1528	A Gazelle helicopter, tail number 12756, was observed departing Zaluzani airfield.	South-east Slow 300 feet
204	26 November	1538	1541	Detected 15 NM south of Sarajevo heading west. The contact faded from radar coverage 5 NM south-east of Konjic.	West 280 KTS (320 mph) Unknown

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Annex II

Supplementary report on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations Protection Force (17-19 November 1992)

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
133	17 November	1840	-	Sector-W reported that a green helicopter entered UNPA on 17 November at 1660 local time flying over Stara Gradiska from south to north, landed at Okucani. One coffin wrapped in "Krajina flag" was off-loaded; helicopter returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina.	-
134	18 November	0845	0905	United Nations military observers (UNMOs) have reported that a Gazelle helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield heading east. This flight was declared a medical evacuation flight. No medical evacuation operations were observed. The helicopter returned to Zaluzani.	East Fast 200 feet
135	18 November	1006	1146	UNMOs have reported that a MI-8 helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield heading south. This flight was declared a medical evacuation flight. No medical evacuation operations were observed. The helicopter returned and landed at Zaluzani. This helicopter was fitted with rocket pylons. However, no ordnance was seen.	South Fast 300 feet
136	18 November	1200	Not known	UNMOs have reported that a Gazelle helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield heading east.	East Fast 200 feet
137	18 November	1218	1603	UNMOs have reported that a Gazelle helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield heading south. It also passed by the airfield at 1310. The helicopter returned and landed at Zaluzani.	South Fast 200 feet
138	18 November	1341	1402	UNMOs have reported that a V-51 (UTVA) aircraft was observed flying circuits and aerobatics at Zaluzani airfield.	Local Fast 500 feet

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
139	18 November	1405	Not known	UNMOs have reported that a MI-8 helicopter was observed departing Zaluzani airfield heading north-east. It was not possible to confirm the mission of this helicopter.	North-east Slow 300 feet
140	18 November	2035	Not known	UNMOs have reported that a CASA-212 aircraft landed at Cazin airfield and offloaded 5 passengers and 1200 kgs of equipment. Inspection showed the consignment to have no weapons or ammunition.	-
141	18 November	2333	-	UNMOs have reported that an unidentified aircraft overflew Bogovolja from direction of Bihac towards Slunj.	-
142	18 November	2359	Not known	UNMOs have reported that an aircraft overflew Cazin airfield. It could not be identified because of low cloud.	-
143	19 November	0230	-	Sector-N has reported that an unidentified aircraft flew from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Bogovolja heading towards Slunj.	-
144	19 November	1710	1750	UNMOs have reported that a CASA-212 aircraft from Zagreb landed at Cazin airfield. It had been carrying passengers and a consignment of clothing. The aircraft was inspected and no ammunition or weapons were found.	-
145	19 November	1900	-	UNMOs have reported that an ANTONOV-2 aircraft was heard circling overhead the Cazin airfield and made an approach to land. However, it did not land and returned to Zagreb.	-
146	19 November	1920	-	UNMOs have reported that the aircraft in serial 144 departed Cazin airfield with 18 passengers and 1 casualty.	-

SRL	Date	Time of observation (UTC) Start	End	Remarks	Heading, speed, altitude
147	19 November	1930	-	Sector-N has reported that an unidentified aircraft flew from north to south in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina close to the border 10 km south of Velika Kladusa.	-
148	19 November	2035	2100	UNMOs reported that two unidentified aircraft overflew Bogovolja from Mela Gradusa towards Slunj.	-
149	19 November	2230 2400	- -	Sector-N has reported that two unidentified aircraft flew from the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Bogovolja heading towards Slunj.	-